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Abstract: We combine a paleoclimate reconstruction of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO)- 
a key determinant of Scandinavian winter intensity- with four centuries of historical 
production data from Sweden, to examine the changing influence of climate variability on 
production over time. We find the colder, drier winters associated with the negative phase of 
the NAO led to reduced economic production for much of Swedish history, and that this 
relationship changed with development: during industrialization, Sweden underwent a 
transition from ‘level’ effects, where harsh winters lowered average incomes, to ‘growth’ 
effects, where it reduced growth in improving living standards. Post-industrialization, neither 
‘level’ nor ‘growth’ effects remain. We use sectoral production data to show that the growth 
effects uncovered in the industrialization period are strongest in the sectors of the economy 
most exposed to the climate and of greatest importance to the industrialization process, namely, 
transport, manufacturing and construction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The climate's influence on aggregate productivity has long been of interest to economists, and 
concerns over climate change have led to major advances in both the theory and empirics of 
climate impacts in recent years (Hsiang (2010); Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015); Carleton and 
Hsiang (2016)). Robust evidence at both the micro and macro levels now supports a causal role 
for factors such as excess temperature, rainfall variability, and a host of other climatically 
mediated outcomes on growth and development, informing everything from the social cost of 
carbon to our understanding of the long-term relationship between geography and 
development.  
A consistent finding in this literature underscores the heterogeneous nature of the 
climate's influence on growth at differing levels of development. Research using modern data 
has documented significantly worse impacts of the climate on growth for poorer countries 
(Dell, Jones and Olken (2012)), a finding consistent with poorer countries' both greater 
exposure to agricultural risk as well as their generally higher average exposure to high 
temperatures, which are increasingly recognized as having nonlinearly deleterious effects 
(Schlenker and Roberts (2009); Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015)). The broad correlation 
between poverty and exposure to tropical climates has thus hindered attempts to estimate the 
evolution of the climate-growth relationship at differing levels of development, hampering 
efforts to understand both historical and future adaptation. 
In this paper we take advantage of unusually long, time series data for Sweden to 
directly estimate how climate variability's influence on growth changes with development. 
Specifically, we combine Edvinsson (2005)'s annual estimates of historical Swedish GDP from 
1659-2015 with Luterbacher et al. (2001)'s paleoclimate reconstruction of the North Atlantic 
Oscillation (NAO), a climatic oscillation1 corresponding to the primary interannual mode of 
variability for the North Atlantic, which exerts notable influence on weather outcomes in 
Northern Europe and Scandinavia (Visbeck et al. (2001); Grossmann and Klotzbach (2009)). 
Since the “positive” mode of the NAO is associated with warmer and wetter winters in Sweden, 
and the negative mode with drier, colder ones, our approach allows us to use the NAO as proxy 
data for winter intensity during our sample period, despite the lack of widespread instrumental 
                                                 
1 Climate oscillations, such as the El-Nino Southern Oscillation, are correlated patterns of climate outcome 
identified in time series data, and form one of the primary ways of decomposing spatial and temporal variability in 
the climate. For more background see Grossi, Monim and Gangopadhyay (2017). 
data prior to the 1800s. We then lever the exogenous nature of variability in the NAO to 
effectively compare Sweden to itself over time, estimating the causal effect of bad winters on 
aggregate economic production, while using a variety of techniques to control for secular 
trends and specifically identify the NAO's influence.  
We find evidence in a variety of models that the colder, drier winters, proxied by the 
NAO, hampered economic production in Sweden for much of its history, and that this 
relationship has furthermore changed with time. Prior to industrialization in the mid 1800s, 
when average economic growth was low, the NAO directly influenced the level of production 
per person, with a 1 increase in the NAO corresponding to a 0.96% increase in income per 
capita. This finding underscores the relative vulnerability of the Swedish population to weather 
shocks, and is consistent with the historical literature emphasizing the devastating role of bad 
winters during this period, part of which spans the “Little Ice Age” of lower-than-normal 
temperatures in Europe (Pfister and Brázdil (2006); Robock (1980)). This levels effect 
disappears once industrialization took off in Sweden2, where we instead find evidence that the 
bad winters reduced growth, with a 1 increase in the NAO associated with a 1.07 percentage 
point increase in growth for the 1846-1945 period. This growth effect is both similar in 
magnitude to prior estimates from the literature (Dell, Jones and Olken (2012); Burke, Hsiang 
and Miguel (2015)), as well as being consistent with Sweden's position on the cold side of 
Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015)’s  estimated global optimum in economic production at 13C 
(Sweden's average temperature is ~5C). For the period following a second breakpoint in the 
sample, coinciding with the conclusion of World War two, we find neither a level nor a growth 
effect. 
An examination of production broken down by sector of the economy sheds more light 
on these findings. The growth effect we observe during the industrialization phase is driven by 
strong effects in those industries most exposed to the climate, and of greatest importance to the 
process of industrialization, namely, transport, manufacturing and construction. A 1 increase 
in the NAO is associated with 2.6, 1.6 and 2.6 percentage point increases in GDP per capita 
growth in the transport, manufacturing and construction industries, respectively. While there 
is no discernible aggregate growth effect post-industrialization, the sectoral analysis provides 
                                                 
2 We run a trend break test to formally define when industrialization take off, though our results hold broadly for 
any splitting of the sample around the mid 1800s. 
evidence of an effect of the NAO on the growth rate of GDP per capita in the agricultural 
sector for this period. Here, we observe a 2.0 percentage point increase for every 1 increase in 
the winter NAO index. Additionally, there is evidence of growth effects in the public services 
and real estate sectors in the post-1946 sample. However, in contrast, we find that an increase 
in the NAO index, and hence warmer, wetter winters, is associated with a decrease in output in 
these sectors; -1.0 and -0.8 percentage points per 1, respectively. In light of the Swedish 
macroeconomic policy approach in the post-world war II decades, which emphasized the 
smoothing of economic fluctuations through heavy state interventionism (Bergh (2014)), we 
posit that the negative growth effect observed in public spending could be due to consumption 
smoothing measures implemented by the Swedish government, in response to realized winter 
conditions. That is, public spending was increased to counteract the detrimental effects of harsh 
winter conditions and reduced following winters of more favorable climate conditions. We 
attempt to provide support for this claim by investigating corresponding monetary policy 
responses. However, we do not find conclusive evidence that the interest rate fluctuated 
according to winter conditions. 
We perform a variety of robustness checks to substantiate our findings, with our model 
producing broadly consistent results across a variety of specifications of the time trend and 
measures of winter intensity (see appendix). 
Together, our results suggest that industrialization fundamentally changed how climate 
variability affected economic production in Sweden, from ‘level’ effects, where climate 
variability was a direct determinant of average income per person in a given year, to ‘growth’ 
effects, where it reduced growth in improving living standards, to no effects. This difference in 
results both echoes the broader literature's finding of consistently worse effects of climate 
variability in poorer countries, and further supports a view that shifting from a largely natural 
capital base to a mechanized, industrial capital base helped to vastly attenuate the welfare 
effects of bad winters. 
Our results contribute to the broad literature on climate impacts on growth, in 
particular the literatures on adaptation and heterogeneous effects of climate variability. 
Additionally, our findings contribute to the literature on historical development and the 
environment, and represent one of the very few analyses estimating social effects of the climate 
for the same country both before and after industrialization. This paper also contributes to the 
relatively small literature documenting the economic effects of cold weather, few of which 
examine effects on poor or developing countries (Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2015)). 
 
2. Literature Review 
While a growing body of research demonstrates damaging effects of the climate on 
important economic and social outcomes, there remains uncertainty over the extent to which 
these effects aggregate to manifest in country-level economic activity, as well as the 
heterogeneity of such effects according to the level of development of a country. Much of the 
existing work in this vein focuses on cross-country comparisons. However, in this paper we 
make a unique contribution by investigating a single country- Sweden- from a historical 
perspective. This allows for an examination of the climate-economy relationship throughout 
the development process, as Sweden transitioned from a developing to a developed nation. 
An inconsistency emerges from the findings in the current literature. On the one hand, 
micro-level evidence points to a wide range of impacts of the climate on the productive 
components of human society (Dell, Jones and Olken (2014); Hsiang (2016). More specifically, 
temperature appears to induce non-linear effects on both crops and humans. However, 
aggregate productivity does not display such clear responses to the same climate variables at 
the macroeconomic level, particularly in the case of developed countries.  
Agronomic studies of the effect of climate variables on crop yields tend to find a positive 
relationship between winter temperatures and winter wheat yields in the cases of the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden (Landau et al. (1998); Olesen et al. (2000); Enquist (1929)). Similar 
results can be expected for other overwintering field crops, including winter rye and barley 
(Vico, Hurry and Weih (2014)). This is particularly informative in the case of Sweden, where 
wheat is a key crop in an agricultural sector that has been dominated by grain production over 
recent centuries (Saifi and Drake (2008)). Further, it is likely that winter conditions, in 
particular, are important to yields in Sweden because the northern limit for cultivation of 
winter grain varieties passes through the country (Holmer (2008)). The limiting factor beyond 
this latitude is low temperature, as vernalization of winter wheat requires a temperature range 
of -4- 17 C (Weir et al. (1984); Porter et al. (1987)). Crop loss can be caused by temperatures 
outside of this range and so the extreme temperature lows experienced during mid- to north-
Scandinavian winters pose a serious threat to wheat growth (Harrison and Butterfield (1996)). 
Similarly, the establishment of winter wheat fails when there is excessive rainfall, meaning that 
mean annual precipitation of greater than 1000 mm usually prevents wheat cultivation 
(Bunting et al. (1982)). 
A second body of micro-level evidence linking climate to productivity focusses on its 
effect on humans. Although the physiological effects of heat stress have been studied 
extensively (Ramsey and Morrissey (1978); Wyon (2001); Pilcher, Nadler and Busch (2002); 
Hancock and Vasmatzidis (2003); Seppanen, Fisk and Faulkner (2003); Hancock, Ross and 
Szalma (2007)), this evidence is often overlooked when modelling the impact of climate on 
economic outcomes. Hsiang (2010) highlights the potential for climate to affect labour 
productivity in showing that short-term increases in surface temperature reduce economic 
output in a sample of Caribbean-basin countries, even in industries previously thought to be 
isolated from climate fluctuations. The magnitude of the temperature-induced losses in non-
agricultural industries relative to the agricultural sector is cited as support for the hypothesis 
that the underlying mechanism at work is a reduction in the productivity of human labour at 
higher temperatures. Moreover, the observed losses in production are concentrated in the 
hottest season of the year, consistent with non-linearity of the effects of temperature on human 
productivity. In complement, Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014) find that, when temperature rises 
above 85F, individuals’ time allocated to labour falls in climate-exposed industries in the US. 
Since time is mostly reallocated to indoor leisure, this constitutes a reduction in the marginal 
productivity of labour. However, in contrast to the findings for labour productivity, an absence 
of any effect of temperature on labour supply in climate-insulated industries, underscores the 
importance of workers’ exposure to the climate and the role played by adaptive technology, 
such as air conditioning.  
Despite these documented effects of climate variables on two key productive 
components of the economy- crops and humans- studies do not find corresponding effects on 
aggregate economic output in developed countries. Dell, Jones and Olken (2012), for example, 
show that negative effects of higher temperatures on economic growth apply only to poor 
countries. While Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2010), use a cross-country panel regression 
framework to demonstrate that lower rainfall has a negative effect on economic growth, but 
only in sub-Saharan African countries. 
Differing explanations for the apparent contradiction between micro and macro- level 
findings have been offered. One hypothesis proposes that, as countries develop, economic 
progress becomes increasingly decoupled from environmental conditions. Foundational to this 
idea is the assumption of substitutability between natural capital and human-made capital 
(Hartwick (1977); Solow (1974)). In this framework, richer countries are better able to cope 
with changes in the climate because they have more resources available to invest in adaptive 
solutions (Kahn (2005)). For example, innovation of new climate-robust varieties (Olmstead 
and Rhode (2011)); migration away from adverse climate conditions (Hornbeck (2012)); or 
defensive investment in technologies that mitigate adverse climate impacts, such as air 
conditioning (Barreca et al. (2013)).  
However, there is also evidence suggesting that, to a certain extent, developed countries 
remain vulnerable to adverse climate effects. Schlenker and Roberts (2009) uncover non-linear 
effects of temperature on corn, soybean and cotton yields in the US. They find that yields 
increase gradually with temperatures up to 29-32C, but decrease sharply beyond the threshold 
temperature. Moreover, this relationship holds for the periods 1950-1977 and 1978-2005, 
suggesting limited historical adaptation of crops to extreme heat. Correspondingly, Deryugina 
and Hsiang (2014) find that total personal income per capita in the US is greatest when the 24-
hour average temperature is between 9-15C, and declines on hotter days. Since the data is for 
the period 1969-2011, their result suggests a continued impact of climate on income in the 
modern US.  
Alternatively, Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015) reconcile the results by accounting for 
non-linearity of country-level output in temperature. They find that aggregate economic 
production is smooth, non-linear and concave in temperature, with maximum production 
occurring at 13C. Moreover, the result holds for both rich and poor countries. This helps to 
explain the finding of no linear relationship between temperature and growth in rich countries. 
Rich countries are roughly symmetrically distributed about the optimum and so a 
counterbalancing of outcomes above and below 13C means that linear regression reveals no 
average effect. 
It should be noted that much of the literature discussed thus far pertains to the effect of 
temperature on economic activity, often with a view to informing projections of the potential 
impacts of global warming. But the climate is composed of a complex interplay between a 
number of different variables, including but not limited to, temperature, precipitation, solar 
radiation and wind (Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011)). Heavy precipitation has been linked to 
production losses in the US, resulting from the effect of excessive soil moisture on crop yields 
(Rosenzweig et al. (2002)). Along similar lines, Schlenker and Roberts (2009) uncover an 
inverted-U shaped relationship between precipitation and US crop yields. Additionally, frost 
can have severely damaging effects during the growth phase of the crop lifecycle (Parry et al. 
(2007)); of particular concern in this context, since much of Sweden's agriculture is occurring at 
ecological limits and, hence, is especially sensitive to the severity of winters (Straile and 
Stenseth (2007)). 
Just as for crops, human responses are not limited to the effects of heat stress either.  
Although less widely studied, it is likely that humans are also negatively impacted by extremes 
at the other end of the temperature scale. Deschenes and Greenstone (2011)’s finding that 
annual mortality rates increase for each additional day both above 90F and below 20F, 
indicates a possibility for adverse effects resulting from extreme cold. Of particular relevance in 
this realm, negative effects of cold temperatures on harvests and population growth in Sweden 
are explicitly referenced by Edvinsson in the supporting documentation to the Swedish GDP 
data we use in this study (Edvinsson, Jacobson and Waldenström (2014)).   
But, examining the effects of each climate variable individually does not advance an 
understanding of how such effects interact in the context of a complex climate system. 
Tubiello, Soussana and Howden (2007) allude to the importance of accounting for possible 
interaction effects- in particular, between temperature, precipitation and CO2 levels- concluding 
that models currently used to simulate crop yield responses to the climate need to do a better 
job of incorporating interactions between different climate variables. In this paper, we use an 
NAO index as a macro-scale proxy measure to capture overall climate variation in the North 
Atlantic region (Stephenson et al. (2003)). This allows for an investigation into responses to an 
overall representation of the climate.  
Another important consideration highlighted in the current literature is the distinction 
between the effect of climate on the level of economic output and its effect on economic growth. 
Earlier work tended to focus on the ‘level’ effects of climate on income. Investigation into the 
relationship between average temperature and aggregate economic variables in the cross-
section uncovers a negative correlation. Dell, Jones and Olken (2009), for example, show that 
national income falls 8.5% per C in the world cross section. However, it is disagreed upon 
whether this relationship is causal, in the sense that geographic conditions play a role in 
determining development (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999); Nordhaus (2006)), or whether 
the relationship is driven by important omitted variables, such as social and political 
institutions, that are correlated with geographic conditions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2002); Easterly and Levine (2003); Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004)). An alternative 
methodology entails quantifying climate effects at the micro-level and then aggregating them 
via a modelling approach. Consistent with the micro-level findings already discussed, these 
studies suggest that output in climate-sensitive sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, tends 
to display an inverted-U shaped relationship with absolute temperature (Mendelsohn and 
Neumann (1999); McCarthy (2001); Mendelsohn, Dinar and Sanghi (2001); Tol (2002)). 
Seminal work by Fankhauser and Tol (2005) marked the advent of more serious consideration 
of dynamic impacts of the climate. The authors propose two main theoretical channels through 
which climate affects economic growth, rather than just the level of output: via capital 
accumulation and via savings. The capital accumulation argument posits that, if the climate has 
a negative impact on contemporaneous output, the capital stock is reduced in the long-run, and 
hence, so is GDP. In an endogenous growth framework, this effect is exacerbated if lower 
investment also slows down technical progress and improvements in labour productivity or 
human capital accumulation. The direction of the effect is less clear with regards to savings. On 
the one hand, savings rates may increase if individuals wish to compensate for shortfalls in 
future income. On the other hand, if climate reduces the productivity of capital, individuals may 
prefer to invest less due to a lower rate of return. Fankhauser and Tol (2005) proceed to test 
this theory using the DICE climate model (Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)). They are able to show 
that the impact of climate change on output via reduced growth, is larger than the direct ‘levels’ 
effect. Further channels through which the climate has the potential to influence an economy's 
ability to grow are suggested by Dell, Jones and Olken (2012); namely, by affecting investments 
or institutions that influence productivity growth.  
 
3. Background and Data  
3.1 The North Atlantic Oscillation 
Motivated by the desire to investigate the effect of climate variability on economic 
outcomes from a historical perspective, our choice of climate variable in this study is an index of 
the intensity of the North Atlantic Oscillation, created by Luterbacher et al. (2001). The index 
extends back to 1659, providing a macro-scale proxy measure to capture climate variation, 
throughout Sweden's historical transition from developing to industrialized nation.   
The North Atlantic Oscillation is the dominant pattern of atmospheric circulation 
variability over the North Atlantic basin (Luterbacher et al. (2001)). It constitutes a back-and-
forth switching between two modes; positive and negative. These modes are defined by a sea-
level, atmospheric pressure differential between a low-pressure system over Iceland and a high 
pressure system over the Azores (Rodwell, Rowell and Folland (1999)). This gradient is always 
low-high, but a measure of NAO intensity reflects the strength of the gradient. The positive 
mode corresponds to a strong low over Iceland and a strong high over the Azores, while a 
negative mode results from a weak Icelandic low and weak Azores high.  
The mode of the NAO is highly influential in determining winter climate conditions in 
Western Europe and Scandinavia. The pressure differential between the ‘Azores high’ and the 
‘Icelandic low’ affects the track and intensity of the North Atlantic jet stream; the surface 
westerly winds that travel from the East coast US to Western Europe (Hurrell (1996)). In turn, 
this affects heat and moisture transport, which governs temperature and precipitation 
realizations (Walker and Bliss (1932)). A positive phase of the NAO is associated with warmer 
and wetter than average winters in Scandinavia, while a negative NAO is associated with colder 
and drier winters (Visbeck et al. (2001)).  
The Luterbacher (2001) NAO index was constructed by, first, calculating the mean sea-
level atmospheric pressure over four grid points, on a 5x 5 longitude-latitude grid, for each of 
the Azores and Iceland. The standardized (1901-1980) difference between these two averages is 
then computed to give the index. Luterbacher et al's original reconstruction (Luterbacher et al. 
(1999)) yielded a time series of this NAO index extending back to 1675, at monthly resolution. 
For the post-1780 period, sea-level pressure data was obtained from the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research (Trenberth and Paolino Jr (1980)). However, instrumental data is not 
available for the 1675- 1780 time period, and so the reconstruction is based on estimations of 
temperature, precipitation and other paleo-environmental indices, calculated from proxy 
observational data of ice, snow, tree-rings and phenological and biological features (Jones et al. 
(1999); Luterbacher et al. (1999)).  The reconstruction was later extended back to 1659 
(Luterbacher et al. (2001)), using additional predictors from various data collection sites in 
Western Eurasia. This yields a time series of monthly observations for the period January 1659 
to July 2001.  
The NAO exerts greatest influence on surface temperature and precipitation in the 
North Atlantic region during the boreal winter because this is when the atmosphere is most 
dynamically active and, thus, perturbations grow to their greatest amplitude (Hurrell and 
Deser (2009), Scaife et al. (2014); Visbeck et al. (2001)). For our analysis, we, therefore, focus on 
a measure that captures winter realizations of the state of the NAO (figure 1A). The DJFM 
average is the mean of Luterbacher's monthly NAO index for the months December, January, 
February and March; an assemblage used frequently in the existing climate literature 
(Burningham and French (2013)). Although this is a widely accepted measure of winter 
intensity, in the appendix we provide further evidence of a close coupling between the NAO 
DJFM average index and winter temperatures in Sweden. In the case of Sweden, an increase in 
the value of the index corresponds to a move towards a warmer and wetter winter, and away 
from a colder and drier winter. Our results are also largely stable across alternative 
characterizations of winter conditions in Sweden, which we show in the appendix. Figure 1A, a 
time series plot of the winter average, shows that fluctuations between the positive and 
negative mode do not follow any particular periodicity; they can range from inter-annual to 
inter-decadal. 
 
3.2 Swedish Historical Growth Statistics 
Our measure of Swedish GDP is based on a time series constructed by Edvinsson 
(2005), presented in Historical Monetary and Financial Statistics for Sweden, vol. II 
(Edvinsson, Jacobson and Waldenström (2014)). Swedish historical national accounts were first 
published in 1937 (Lindahl, Dahlgren and Kock (1937)). However, the Edvinsson (2005) series 
includes revisions made to improve the comparability of data over time, as well as the reliability 
of estimates of both long-term trends and annual fluctuations, using data from Swedish 
Industrial Statistics, which has been published annually since 1858; Sweden's annual official 
agricultural statistics, which date back to 1802; and annual population data, which has been 
gathered since 1749. Additionally, observations were extended back to 1620, to arrive at the 
time series we use in this study. 
We consider two variants of GDP per capita measures: GDP per capita by activity and 
GDP per capita by expenditure, each with annual observations for 1620- 2013. GDP per capita 
by activity is directly computed as the sum of all economic activities’ gross values added, where 
the gross value added of each activity is gross output minus intermediate consumption. GDP 
per capita by expenditure is calculated as the sum of different uses: private final consumption, 
government final consumption, investment and net export. Values are given in reference prices 
for the year 2000, in Swedish Krona (SEK). When examining the levels effect of climate 
variability on GDP per capita, we consider the natural log of the GDP per capita by 
expenditure variable (figure 1B). To examine growth effects, we create a variable containing 
the annual growth rate for GDP per capita by expenditure (figure 1C). 
By combining our measures of NAO winter intensity and Swedish GDP per capita, we 
are able to investigate the climate-economy relationship over the period 1659-2001. The results 
presented throughout are for the GDP per capita by expenditure variable. We omit results for 
the GDP per capita by activity variable because it correlates at 0.9999 with the expenditure 
version.  
 
3.2 Swedish Interest Rate 
We obtain interest rate data directly from Sweden's central bank, the Sveriges Riksbank 
(Sveriges Riksbank, 2018). Since we wish to investigate monetary policy responses for the post 
World War II period of our sample (1946-2001), we use the discount rate, because data is 
available for the full time frame. The discount rate, set every quarter by the Swedish National 
Debt Office, was the Sveriges Riksbank's official interest rate up until 1st July 2002 (Sveriges 
Riksbank, 2018). We use yearly average values in our analysis, in accordance with the 
resolution of our climate measure. Additionally, we check the robustness of our results to the 
use of the August value alone. This observation provides a measure of the discount rate, 
subsequent to any adjustments made during the first two quarters of the year, and hence 
following the winter months. 
 
4. Methods 
In order to estimate the causal effect of the NAO on the economic outcome under 
consideration, we exploit a natural experiment created by the random, year-to-year variation in 
the phase of the NAO. The unit of observation acts as its own counterfactual in that it is 
compared to itself at different points in time; before and after ‘treatment’, i.e. different climatic 
outcomes (Hsiang, Burke and Miguel (2013); Auffhammer et al. (2013); Dell, Jones and Olken 
(2014); Hsiang (2016)). In this case, the identifying assumption is that climate conditions are 
exogenously determined by the climate system. We argue that this is a reasonable assumption 
when considering the NAO, since fluctuations between the positive and negative modes do not 
display strong periodicity. It is, therefore, hard to believe that human behavior is adapted in 
anticipation of a particular state of the NAO, which would be problematic in that it would 
introduce endogeneity to the system.  Further, the NAO was not even discovered until the 
1920s, which supports our argument that humans are not able to adjust responses according to 
a predicted state of the NAO.  
We estimate the following model: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 𝑁𝐴𝑂𝑡 + 𝛾. 𝑓(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑡 is log GDP per capita or GDP per capita growth rate; NAO is the mean DJFM state 
of the NAO in year t; 𝑓(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) is either a cubic trend in year or decade fixed effects; and 
standard errors are robust.        
The time trend in this model accounts for other time-trending variables, such as 
demographic or institutional changes, which could be correlated with both the climate and the 
outcome variable. The coefficient of interest, β, measures the effect of the average winter state 
of the NAO on the level or growth rate of GDP per capita, respectively. 
We separate our analysis into three distinct time periods. It is clear from figure 1B that 
Sweden entered a phase of rapid economic growth around the mid-19th century. Prior to this, 
income per capita hovered around a fairly constant long–run equilibrium. However, in the late 
1800s, income per capita was rising rapidly, as Sweden industrialized. To formally separate 
these two regimes, we conduct a Quandt likelihood ratio test, which objectively tests for the 
presence of an unknown break point. The year 1846 is identified as the point at which a 
structural break occurs in the log GDP per capita data series (figure A1). Further, the Quandt 
likelihood ratio test also provides suggestive evidence of a second structural break at the year 
1946 (figure A1), coinciding with the conclusion of the second World War, and hence, we also 
split the series here. This generates three periods- 1659-1845, 1846-1945, 1946-2001- which 
we investigate concomitantly.  
 
5. Results 
Table 1 presents our main findings. In the ‘levels’ regressions (columns 1, 3 & 5) we 
observe statistically significant coefficients on the NAO winter average index for the pre-1846 
sample, but not in the 1846-1945 or post-1946 samples. However, in the ‘growth’ regressions 
(columns 2, 4 & 6), we see a statistically significant effect of the NAO on the GDP per capita 
growth rate for the 1846-1945 sample, but not the pre-1846 or post-1946 samples. The 
magnitude of these effects is economically meaningful. Pre-1846, a 1 unit increase in the NAO 
winter average index increases per capita GDP by 1.1%. This corresponds to a 0.95% increase 
in Swedish GDP per capita for each 1 increase in the NAO winter average index.  
For the industrialization phase (1846-1945), we find that a 1 unit increase in the NAO 
winter average index increases the growth rate of GDP per capita by 1.22 percentage points, 
which corresponds to 1.05 percentage points per 1 increase in the NAO winter average index. 
For purposes of comparison, this comports with the effect of a 1 increase in temperature 
estimated in Dell, Jones and Olken (2012)3. There is neither a statistically significant effect of 
the NAO winter average index on the level of GDP per capita nor on the growth rate of GDP 
per capita in the post-1946 sample.  
We interpret these findings as a transition from an effect of climate fluctuations on the 
level of economic output; to an effect on the growth rate of economic output; to no discernible 
effect on economic output, coinciding with the timing of industrialization in Sweden and the 
conclusion of the second World war, respectively.  
Next, we explore the composition of our findings in greater depth. For the period 1800-
2001, we use data which breaks down total Swedish GDP per capita by the sector in which it 
was generated. We do not find evidence of any levels effect for the pre-1846 period, so we focus 
our analysis on growth effects in the 1846-1945 and post-1945 samples. Table 2 shows that the 
1846-1945 positive growth effect is detectable in the manufacturing, construction, transport, 
real estate and public services sectors (columns 2, 3, 4, 6 & 8). The largest and strongest of 
these is observed in the transport sector- a particularly climate-exposed industry- where we see 
a 3 percentage point increase in the per capita growth rate for every unit increase in the NAO 
winter average index. This equates to 2.6 percentage points per 1 increase in the NAO winter 
average index. Also statistically significant at the 5% level is a 1.82 percentage point increase in 
the per capita growth rate in manufacturing, per unit increase in the NAO winter average 
index, or 1.6 percentage points per 1 increase. 
In contrast, for the post-1946 (columns 9-16) period, a positive growth effect is seen 
only in the agricultural sector (column 9); 2.3 percentage points per unit increase in the winter 
NAO index, which corresponds to 2.0 percentage points per 1 increase. However, in this later 
period we also see an appearance of negative growth effects of the NAO on GDP in the real 
                                                 
3 In Dell, Jones and Olken (2012), the standard deviation of annual temperature, once country, region x year, and 
poor country x year fixed effects are removed, is 0.50C, and so a 1 increase in annual temperature reduces 
growth rate by 0.69 percentage points in their sample of poor countries. 
estate and public services sectors (columns 14 & 16). The GDP per capita growth rate 
decreases 1.15 percentage points per unit increase in the winter NAO index, while the 
corresponding decrease in the real estate sector is 0.91 percentage points (respectively, 1.0 and 
0.8 percentage points per 1). Given that Sweden's macroeconomic policy approach in the 
period immediately following World War II targeted the smoothing of economic fluctuations 
through heavy state interventionism (Bergh (2014)), we interpret these effects as suggestive of 
government responsiveness to realized winter conditions. That is, an increase in spending in 
public services in response to harsh winter conditions and their associated detrimental effects, 
and a decrease in public services spending following a winter of more favorable climate 
conditions.  
We attempt to provide support for this claim by investigating corresponding monetary 
policy responses. If the Swedish Government was, indeed, aiming to achieve smoothing of 
business cycle dynamics induced by fluctuations in winter intensity, then we would expect to 
see pro-cyclical movement of the interest rate with the NAO winter average index. However, 
we do not find conclusive evidence of changes in the interest rate, according to winter 
conditions. Columns 1-3 in appendix table A2 shows the association between the NAO winter 
average index and the level of the discount rate, across model specifications including a linear, 
quadratic and cubic time trend, respectively. We see that with a quadratic or cubic time trend, a 
1 unit increase in the NAO winter average index is associated with, approximately, a 0.45 
percentage point increase in the level of the discount rate, for the post-1945 period. But, we do 
not observe a statistically significant effect of the NAO on the year-to-year change in the 
discount rate, in any of the specifications (table A2, columns 4-6). We check the sensitivity of 
these results to use of the August value of the discount rate, as opposed to the annual average 
value. This observation provides a measure of the discount rate, subsequent to any adjustments 
made during the first two quarters of the year, and hence following the winter period. The 
results are almost identical to those generated using the annual mean. At best, this is very weak 
evidence of a monetary policy response to winter intensity.   
 
6. Discussion 
 While much of the existing literature linking the climate to economic production focuses 
on damages caused by extreme heat, in this paper we examine the effect of temperatures at the 
other end of the temperature distribution. Our finding of a negative impact of colder winters on 
economic output and economic growth in Sweden, suggests that damages caused by cold 
temperatures should raise cause for concern, in particular contexts. The 1.1% decrease in GDP 
per capita induced by a colder than average winter in the pre-1846 period supports the view that 
cold temperatures acted as a binding constraint on production in pre-industrial Sweden.  
By examining outcomes for Sweden over a long time horizon, we are able to track the 
country through different phases of its development. During the period 1659-1846, Sweden can 
be considered a low growth, poor country, with GDP per capita fluctuating around a relatively 
stable equilibrium level. Our results show that during this phase of development, climate 
fluctuations had an effect on the absolute size of the Swedish economy; per capita income is higher 
in warmer and wetter winters, and lower in colder and drier winters. We hypothesize that this 
is a consequence of the central role played by natural capital in the Swedish economy at this stage 
of development. Prior to industrialization, Sweden possessed a largely agricultural economy 
(Edvinsson (2013)). As highlighted by existing literature (McCarthy (2001); Mendelsohn and 
Neumann (1999); Mendelsohn, Dinar and Sanghi (2001); Tol (2002)), the climate has an ability 
to directly affect natural capital stocks, and in particular, crop growth growth (Enquist (1929); 
Harrison and Butterfield (1996); Landau et al. (1998, 2000); Olesen et al. (2000); Schlenker and 
Roberts (2009); Vico, Hurry and Weih (2014)). Thus, an economy dominated by natural capital 
is particularly vulnerable to climate shocks and experiences fluctuations in absolute size, when 
subject to variability in climate conditions.  
Around 1846, Sweden began to undergo the industrialization process. Income per capita 
grew at a mean rate of 1.62% per year for the 1846-1945 period. Thus, this phase of Sweden's 
development is characterized by fluctuations in the level of income per capita about an upward 
trend, rather than about a long-run equilibrium level. The transition we uncover, from level to 
growth effects of the NAO on income per capita, coincides with the timing of this shift to a new 
phase of development. We posit that this is due to the Swedish economy's diminishing reliance 
on natural capital, which accompanied growth in the industrial sector and the associated 
accumulation of physical and human capital. While climate fluctuations have a lesser impact on 
the stock of physical and human capital than natural capital, they have the potential to affect 
investment and hence economic growth (Fankhauser and Tol (2005); Dell, Jones and Olken 
(2012)). Hence, we observe an effect of the NAO on the growth rate of per capita income, as 
opposed to the level of income, in the 1846-1945 period.  
In further support of this reasoning, when our findings are broken down by sectors of the 
economy, the strongest effects of climate fluctuations on the GDP per capita growth rate are seen 
in sectors of utmost importance to the industrialization process: transport, manufacturing and 
construction. The transport and construction industries, in particular, are highly exposed to 
climate conditions and so the sensitivity of GDP growth to winter intensity in these sectors falls 
in line with expectations.   
Following the conclusion of World War II in 1945, a second transition in the effect of 
climate on per capita output is uncovered. Neither a level nor a growth effect of the NAO on 
Swedish GDP per capita is evident in the post-1945 period, at the aggregate level. However, for 
this period, we find a positive growth effect in the agricultural sector and negative growth effects 
in the public services and real estate sectors. We consider these counter-cyclical effects in the 
context of Sweden's macroeconomic situation following the second world war. At this time the 
Swedish government relied heavily on state interventionism, with the aim being to minimize 
economic fluctuations for the majority (Bergh (2014)). An extensive welfare state supported 
pensions, unemployment benefits, job training and retraining, disability and sickness benefits, 
health care, parental leave, child allowances, housing and more (Lachs Ginsburg and Rosenthal 
(2006)), forming the bedrock of an egalitarian society that achieved close to full employment. 
We suggest that the negative effect of the NAO on GDP per capita growth rate in public 
services is indicative of the government's responsiveness to fluctuations in winter intensity. 
Following a bad winter, policy aimed to counteract adverse climate impacts on the population by 
expanding public services spending, while a good winter was followed by less aggressive 
spending in public services. We attempt to provide support for this claim by investigating 
corresponding monetary policy responses. Pro-cyclical movement of the interest rate with the 
NAO winter average index, would be indicative of a monetary policy strategy to counteract 
business cycle dynamics, induced by fluctuations in winter intensity. However, we do not find 
strong evidence of changes in the interest rate, in response to winter conditions. 
The difference in our results throughout Sweden's development trajectory echoes the 
broader literature's finding of consistently worse effects of climate variability in poorer countries, 
and further supports a view that shifting from a largely natural capital base to a mechanized, 
industrial capital base helped to vastly attenuate the welfare effects of bad winters.  
Our finding that winter intensity lessened as a binding constraint on economic production 
in Sweden as the country developed is indicative of adaptation to climate conditions. Yet, the 
existing literature provides little evidence of adaptation to mitigate the detrimental effects of 
heating. This suggests that the costs of climate adaptation may be asymmetric across the 
temperature distribution. Since forecasts of climate change over the coming decades are 
dominated by the expectation of large scale warming, this has worrying implications, especially 
given the disproportionate concentration of developing countries at the higher end of the 
temperature distribution. 
Furthermore, variability in the climate is expected to increase over the coming years. 
Within the framework discussed above, greater climate variability translates to larger impacts 
on either the level or the growth rate of income per capita, depending on the phase of 
development in which a country is in. With developing countries expected to be heavily affected 
by climate change, large impacts on the absolute size of the economy in these countries could 
have particularly devastating effects. 
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7. Appendix 
Firstly, we explore alternative specifications of the time trend included in our 
econometric model. A polynomial trend in year, up to order 3, was chosen for our preferred 
specification because linear, quadratic and cubic year terms are statistically significant at the 
5\% level across most of our models and successively adding each term increases the 
explanatory power of the model (Tables A3 & A4). Alternatively, decade fixed effects could 
have been used to model the time trend. Appendix table A5, column 1, shows that the pre-
1846 ‘levels effect’ is no longer statistically significant when we substitute the cubic time 
trend for decade fixed effects. However, this approach raises concerns because the results are 
not robust to shifting the decade cut-points. Since there is nothing inherently meaningful 
about the starting point for a decade, its choice should be arbitrary and have no effect on the 
results. But appendix table A5, columns 2 & 6, show that including fixed effects for decades 
shifted by 5 years, induces statistically significant ‘levels effects’ for both the pre and post-
1846 periods. For this reason, we favour the cubic time trend for our main specification.   
Although the NAO DJFM average index is used widely in the existing climate 
literature as a measure of winter intensity (Burningham and French (2013)), we provide 
further evidence in support of a close coupling between the index and winter temperatures in 
Sweden. Table A6 shows that winter temperatures in Sweden (Mitchell and Jones (2005)) 
correlate strongly with both the mean annual NAO index and the mean DJFM NAO index 
(columns 2 & 3). However, the R2 value more than doubles when predicting winter 
temperatures with the DJFM version of the index, relative to the annual version. 
Additionally, there is no statistically significant association between the mean annual NAO 
or the mean DJFM NAO and summer temperatures (columns 4 & 5), and the mean MJJA 
NAO predicts summer temperatures with a weaker R2 than the DJFM NAO predicts winter 
temperatures (columns 6 & 3). In sum, this points to a particularly strong influence of the 
NAO over winter temperatures. 
We also investigate alternative measures of the winter climate conditions in Sweden. 
In addition to the winter average NAO index, we constructed winter minimum and winter 
maximum NAO indices, which are the minimum and maximum values, respectively, of 
Luterbacher's monthly NAO index, over the months December, January, February and 
March. Substituting these measures into our model in place of the winter average NAO index 
yields the results presented in appendix table A7. Although the magnitude of the estimated 
effects differ, inclusion of the winter minimum NAO index gives the same major result as the 
winter average NAO index; a transition from ‘level’ to ‘growth’ effects of the NAO on GDP 
per capita, pre and post-1846. For the winter maximum NAO index, the pre-1846 ‘level’ effect 
remains statistically significant, but we find no effect on the post-1846 GDP per capita 
growth rate. However, this remains consistent with the hypothesis that climate effects on 
Swedish GDP are driven by damages due to extreme cold. Whereas the winter minimum 
NAO index captures this extreme end of the temperature scale, the winter maximum NAO 
index does not provide a measure of the most severe conditions experienced in any given 
winter.  
In order to rule out the concern that our results are being driven by growth effects 
stemming from the World Wars, we repeat the analysis omitting the war years (1914-1918 
& 1939-1945). Table A8 shows that, qualitatively, the results for the 1846-1945 are 
unchanged: there is no evidence of a level effect on GDP per capita, but there is a positive 
growth effect, significant at the 10% level, although the magnitude of this effect is reduced  
Following other growth studies which investigate the effect of a temporary, 
exogenous shock (Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2010); Dell, Jones and Olken (2012); Miguel, 
Satyanath and Sergenti (2004); Romer and Romer (2010)), we check for the presence of 
cumulative growth effects by estimating a distributed lag model. In this model, the sum of 
the coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged NAO index gives the cumulative growth 
effect over the period covered by the lagged variables. Our results, presented in appendix 
table A9, show that cumulative growth effects of the NAO are not detectable across a range 
of lag lengths and for both the pre-1846 and post-1846 data samples.  
It has been argued that growth is an auto-regressive process in the short-run. 
Therefore, we also estimate an AR(4) distributed lag model (Table A10). In this approach, we 
add 4 years of lagged growth as regressors, allowing the model to capture the effect of high-
frequency business cycles (Romer and Romer (2010); Cerra and Saxena (2008)). We uncover 
a cumulative growth effect over both 5 years, for the full sample of data (Table A10, columns 
1 & 2).  A 1 unit increase in the NAO average index decreases the 5-year growth rate by 0.98 
percentage points. But we do not find evidence of any cumulative growth effects when we 
split the sample into the pre-1846 and post-1846 periods (Table A10, columns 3-6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
